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#H>HEN L. JOHNSTON /#1730 
^ Q K E # W ) 7 i a — 
&TTTake City, Utah 84110 
Phone: (801) 364-7320 
SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
FREED LEASING, INC., : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
V S . i 
DEBRA K. COMPTON and : 
EDWIN COMPTON, : 
Defendants/Appellants : 
: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO REHEARING 
• Case No. 87-0216 
Plaintiff/Respondent in support of its position submits the following: 
1. Plaintiff requests this court deny the Petition for Rehearing 
requested by the Defendants. 
2. Plaintiff as indicated in its Brief and oral argument earnestly 
feels that Defendants are entitled to absolutely no relief whatsoever and 
further that Plaintiff should be entitled to recover legal expense in this 
action. 
3. Plaintiff, however, accepts the judgment of this court affirming 
the judgment of the trial court for the reason that Plaintiff feels that the 
litigation should come to an end at this time. 
4. Plaintiff would submit the following arguments in opposition to 
Defendants' Rehearing Petition/Memorandum. 
(a) The sole method of creating a homestead is by making a 
selection and recording a Declaration of Homestead. (78-23-4 Utah Code) 
(b) Debra Compton did not purport to create a homestead until 9 
August 1984 when she recorded her purported homestead declaration. All 
during negotiations between the parties no homestead had been filed. At the 
time settlement was made, no homestead had been filed. The check for 
settlement and the filing of the homestead occurred on the same date* It 
wasn't until after the settlement that Plaintiff became aware that the 
homestead had been filed* Therefore, there could not have been any bad faith 
by Plaintiff* 
(c) Debra Compton had previously conveyed the property (one-half) 
to Edwin Compton by quit claim on 29 June 1984. 
(d) 1 August 1984 Debra Compton executed and delivered (as 
attorney-in-fact for her husband) a warranty deed to escrow. 
(e) 57-1-6 Utah Codes says that every conveyance of real estate is 
valid and binding between the parties and all parties having actual notice. 
(f) Since Debra Compton had actual notice of the warranty deed 
because she executed it for Edwin Compton and since Edwin Compton was a party 
to it, they are bound by the warranty deed. The deed is binding between the 
parties and those with knowledge. The deed was valid until set aside in 
March of 1987* 37CJS, Fraudulent Conveyances, Sec. 56. 
(g) Therefore, there was no property to which the homestead could 
attach and the later declaration by Debra Compton of 9 August 1984 was 
invalid. 
(h) Since the purported declaration on 9 August 1984 of homestead 
was invalid, there could be no claim of homestead rights to the proceeds of 
the warranty deed transfer from Edwin Compton to the Joneses. 
(i) Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to any relief on the 
homestead theory and the lower court's judgment allowing it should be 
reversed. 
(j) An additional reason why Defendant's claim for relief on the 
homestead theory should not be allowed is that Freed had an absolute right to 
its judgment lien. It had a right to continue the judgment lien in the face 
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of threats by Defendants to declare a homestead and it had a right to 
continue its judgment lien after a declaration of homestead and it could have 
executed and sold the property if a bid was made which exceeded the homestead 
even if the homestead and prior encumbrances exceeded the market value of the 
property, see Grey vs. Stevens (UT 1956) 302 P 2d 273, 
(k) Another reason recovery on the homestead theory must fail is 
that a judgment lien by law (78-22-1 Utah Code) only applies to unexempt 
property. 
(1) Since Debra Compton's purported Homestead Declaration exceeds 
the amount of Freed's judgment, any transfer would pass any interest free and 
clear of the judgment. The lien was no impediment. 
(m) Therefore, Defendants should have forced the buyers and the 
title company to proceed with the sale (53 CJS Sec. 276, Liable and Slander 
states "Where there is a valid contract regarding real estate and a third 
party [allegedly Freeds] induces a breach of contract the remedy of the 
injured party [Comptons] is against the party refusing to perform (the 
purchaser) and not the person allegedly slandering the title" [Freeds]). 
(n) This case has been exhaustively litigated. The parties have 
had more than ample opportunity to present the issues in both oral and 
memoranda form. 
(o) A chronology of the litigation indicates the following: 
(1) Defendant filed Answer and Counterclaim, Memorandum with 
exhibits--20 pages. 
(2) Defendants filed Memorandum of Points of Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment--20 pages. 
(3) Hearing was held in District Court on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
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(4) District Court denied Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
(5) Defendant filed Motion for Reconsideration for Partial 
Summary Judgment* 
(6) Hearing was held in District Court. 
(7) Reconsideration motion denied. 
(8) Defendants filed Motion to Amend District Court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
(9) Defendants' Motion to Amend Findings and Judgment denied. 
(10) Defendants filed 8-page Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
(11) Defendants filed Docking Statement. 
(12) Defendants filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
with Supreme Court in support of Motion for Summary Disposition. 
(13) Defendants filed Brief with Supreme Court. 
(14) Oral arguments submitted. 
(15) Defendants/Appellants filed Petition for Rehearing--15 
pages. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Rehearing Petition should be denied. 
If a rehearing is granted, the trial court's orders and judgmeng should 
be reversed with instructions to vacate the award of $1,500.00 to the 
Comptons and instructions that Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim should be 
dismissed and with further instructions to award Plaintiff a reasonable 
amount as legal expense because of the correct ruling by the trial court that 
Defendants performed a fraudulent conveyance. 
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DATED this \ ff^ day of June, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that ten (10) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
document was mailed postage-prepaid, to the Clerk, Supreme Court, State of 
Utah, 332 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and one copy to L. 
Benson Mabey, 124 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102; and Freed 
Leasing, 525 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 on this & day of 
June, 1989. 
